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restrictive stance of monetary policy. Such a reaction would, first of all, characterize the Bank 
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secondly, the asymmetry in the feedback function appears justified once the stage in the 
business cycle is also taken into consideration. 
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1. Introduction 
For thirteen years, monetary policy in the United Kingdom (UK) has been operating 
in a regime of inflation targeting, from which the last eight years and a half also under 
operational independence of the central bank. To be more precise, the UK monetary 
authorities moved to inflation(-forecast) targeting1 in October 1992, and in May 1997 
the Bank of England (BoE) was formally granted operational independence2 from Her 
Majesty’s (HM) Treasury. With a sufficient amount of data for the latter period 
having accumulated, the contribution of the present paper is to attempt an objective, 
econometric evaluation of British monetary policy under inflation targeting and, in 
particular, operational independence. For this purpose, we first introduce the recent 
institutional framework for the conduct of monetary policy in the UK as well as our 
methodology and then focus on comparing the policy feedback and stance recovered 
from our sample before and after operational independence. Other types of 
assessment could, of course, be complementary, yet our idea here is to let the data 
speak as much as they can. To do so, we rely on a recent approach in empirical 
monetary policy popularized by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000),3 and having 
solid grounding in New Keynesian macro theory. It involves estimation of forward-
looking Taylor rules incorporating interest rate smoothing via the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) proposed by Hansen (1982). 
We are aware of certain shortcomings in the use of such feedback rules to characterize 
monetary policy.4 Yet their simplicity and reliance on statistical facts rather than 
(‘eloquent’) ex ante intentions or ex post explanations make them a desirable, 
impartial and easily interpretable tool for a straightforward analysis of central banks’ 
policy stance and reaction functions. We believe that some insightful – and 
sufficiently robust – conclusions we were able to extract from the UK data by 
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recurring to forward-looking Taylor rules have largely justified the employed 
methodology. 
Our main findings are summarized next in a preview. First of all, our empirical study 
has confirmed that simple forward-looking Taylor rules based on real-time rather than 
final data perform quite reasonably as a condensed description of monetary policy in 
the UK under inflation targeting. This is particularly noteworthy, insofar the Bank of 
England operates de jure in a targeting rule regime whereas the Taylor rule is an 
instrument rule. Furthermore, our preferred reaction function specifications identify a 
differing policy stance, with one episode of monetary tightening and one episode of 
monetary easing in the pre-independence period and two episodes of monetary easing 
in the post-independence period, which makes good sense within the British 
macroeconomic context. Finally, inflation targeting coupled with operational 
independence does not necessarily mean: 
1) a deflationary bias: in fact, the interest rate in the UK was lower, on average, 
after the move to operational independence; 
2) strict inflation targeting, i.e., that the central bank would not react to the output 
gap: in fact, the Bank of England has responded to the output gap before as 
well as after receiving operational independence; 
3) that the central bank would react in a stronger way to inflation: it may well 
react in a weaker way, depending on the stage of the business cycle and on 
whether inflation has been stabilized around target or not; 
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4) that the central bank would react in a weaker way to the output gap: in fact, the 
Bank of England has reacted more aggressively (and, in this sense, 
asymmetrically) to the output gap after receiving operational independence. 
All these conclusions can basically be explained, as we argue in the paper, by a 
unique underlying cause: one just needs to also take into consideration the relevant 
phase of the business cycle, in particular the dominant (or average) output gap before 
and after operational independence. We thus present evidence that even a greater 
degree of central bank independence in addition to a well-established inflation 
targeting strategy would not imply a ‘benign neglect’ to the business cycle. Such a 
result appears consistent with New Keynesian theory, and the policy of the Bank of 
England throughout the inflation targeting period – optimally chosen to balance 
between ‘rule’ and ‘discretion’ – deserves credit. 
The paper is further down structured as follows. In the next section we summarize the 
major institutional developments in the British framework for monetary policy 
making during the 1990s. We then briefly discuss, in section 3, optimal monetary 
policy and the evolution of feedback rules, while section 4 describes our data and 
some preliminary tests. Section 5 sketches the theory behind the econometric 
approach we apply, and section 6 interprets the key lessons to be learnt from our 
preferred specifications of estimated forward-looking Taylor rules. Section 7 
concludes and the Appendix documents the most important features of our data and 
regression results in a few tables and figures. 
2. The Institutional Framework for UK Monetary Policy since the Early 1990s 
It is widely acknowledged that all significant institutional developments in UK 
monetary policy throughout the 1990s and until now have been implemented 
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following official public announcements. As discussed by Nelson (2003), among 
others, these changes in regime could thus be considered exogenous to the economic 
environment and used for a corresponding ‘periodization’ of monetary policy in the 
UK. We summarize below the principal monetary events since the early 1990s and the 
current policy framework within which the Bank of England operates, as an 
institutional background for our study. 
2.1 Recent History 
The late 1980s were marked by an implicit convergence of the British sterling to the 
Deutsche mark, which ended up in an explicit pegging. Since October 1990 the 
British sterling became an official member of the Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
of the European Community. This experience, however, proved brief and 
disappointing. An aggravating sterling crisis during the summer of 1992 was followed 
by a suspension of the ERM in the UK in September 1992. A way out of the exchange 
rate crisis and restoration of central bank credibility was most immediately seen in the 
innovative strategy of inflation targeting. In October 1992 the United Kingdom 
adopted it, following the example of countries such as New Zealand and Canada. In 
June 1995 the target inflation was reformulated from the initial target band (or range) 
of 1% to 4% (implying a mid-point of 2.5% p.a.) to an explicit medium-term point 
target of 2.5% p.a. – as reported in Haldane (1995) – but remained defined in an 
asymmetrical way. In May 1997 the Bank of England was granted operational 
independence from HM Treasury, and in June 1997 the 2.5% point target was 
announced to become symmetrical: i.e., to give equal weight to circumstances in 
which inflation was higher or lower than the target rate. In December 2003 the target 
inflation was lowered from 2.5% p.a. to 2% p.a. and expressed as from January 2004 
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in terms of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), renamed (again in 
December 2003) to simply the Consumer Price Index (CPI), instead of in terms of the 
Retail Price Index eXcluding the mortgage rate (RPIX).5 The RPIX was the officially 
announced measure of UK inflation and guide for UK monetary policy during the 
1992-2003 period, and the Retail Price Index (RPI), including the mortgage rate, had 
performed that same role before 1992. In fact, the change from RPIX to HICP (or, 
which is the same, CPI) was preannounced half a year in advance: 
“On 9 June 2003, the Chancellor announced that he planned to change the 
inflation target to one based on the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices – 
HICP – instead of the RPIX. This would be the first major change to the 
monetary framework introduced since 1997.”, Bank of England’s website. 
The second sentence in the above quotation is important for our purposes here. It 
basically confirms that there has been no considerable change in UK monetary policy 
since the point when we break our sample, namely the second quarter of 1997 (itself 
excluded from our estimation by subsample), when the Bank of England was granted 
operational independence. Moreover, we would argue that the only other major 
change of a similar magnitude is the break point, namely the third quarter of 1992 
(also excluded from our estimation), after which our sample starts with the 
introduction of inflation targeting. This narrative account of the changes in UK 
monetary policy, reported by a competent and credible primary source of information 
such as the Bank of England, essentially justifies from an institutional and policy 
perspective our sample split in two subsamples as well as the respective estimates and 
comparisons we undertake in the present study. 
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2.2 Current Goal and Instrument 
The current monetary policy framework in the United Kingdom targets inflation but 
does not ignore, or rather aims to indirectly enhance, other ultimate goals such as 
economic growth and employment: 
“The Bank’s monetary policy objective is to deliver price stability – low 
inflation – and, subject to that, to support the Government’s economic 
objectives including those for growth and employment. Price stability is 
defined by the Government’s inflation target of 2%. The remit recognises the 
role of price stability in achieving economic stability more generally, and in 
providing the right conditions for sustainable growth in output and 
employment. The Government’s inflation target is announced each year by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in the annual Budget statement.”, Bank of 
England’s website. 
But to achieve the inflation target, the Bank acts on the short-term interest rate, which 
is thus its operating instrument: 
“When the Bank of England changes the official interest rate it is attempting 
to influence the overall level of expenditure in the economy. When the amount 
of money spent grows more quickly than the volume of output produced, 
inflation is the result. In this way, changes in interest rates are used to control 
inflation. … The Bank supplies the cash which the banking system as a whole 
needs to achieve balance by the end of each settlement day. Because the Bank 
is the final provider of cash to the system it can choose the interest rate at 
which it will provide these funds each day. The interest rate at which the Bank 
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supplies these funds is quickly passed throughout the financial system, 
influencing interest rates for the whole economy.”, Bank of England’s website. 
In this sense, interest rate management preserves crucial importance in an inflation 
targeting regime as well. This is a good reason to expect that empirical studies based 
on Taylor rules, such as ours, may characterize UK monetary policy reasonably well. 
3. Theoretical and Empirical Background on Monetary Policy Rules 
There has been a long debate in the theory and practice of central banking as to what 
is optimal monetary policy: in essence, is it a rule or discretion? Recent trends in the 
debate on policy optimality have converged to what Woodford (2003), p. 2, calls “a 
new consensus in favor of a monetary policy that is disciplined by clear rules intended 
to ensure a stable standard of value, rather than one that is determined on a purely 
discretionary basis to serve whatever ends may seem most pressing at any given 
time”. One should also be, however, careful to distinguish these new policy rules from 
their rigid predecessors such as the gold standard or the fixed money supply growth, 
for instance. The new rules are better characterized as systematic monetary policy, of 
which the most well known example today is inflation targeting. Rule-based 
policymaking of that kind is a combination of a preannounced public commitment to 
an explicit target with a simultaneous communication and explanation of the policy 
actions to achieve the target to the society at large. 
3.1 Taylor(-Type) Instrument Rules 
Woodford (2003), chapter 1, traces the intellectual origins of policy reaction functions 
back to the works of Wicksell (1898, 1907). Wicksell advocated not only a fiat money 
regime for the world as a whole (in place of the then existing gold standard) but also 
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price-level targeting as a preferable monetary strategy: more precisely, the target 
nominal interest rate (NIR) should be adjusted by the central bank in response to the 
price level. The principal benefit from such a rule is that, as Woodford (2003) argues 
in chapter 2 of his book, it is able to stabilize the price index around a constant level. 
Goodhart (1992) has suggested a similar interest rate rule, but in it the NIR target 
responds instead to inflation. The Taylor (1993) rule is an extended interest rate rule 
that includes also an explicit output gap term, in addition to an inflation (and not price 
level) term. Taylor (1993) has insisted and Woodford (2003), p. 39, has stressed that 
such a feedback rule can be regarded both as a rough positive description of the way 
monetary policy had actually been made and as a straightforward normative 
prescription of how monetary policy should optimally be conducted.6 
In the original notation, the monetary policy rule Taylor (1993) proposed was: 
( ) 225.05.0 +−++= pypr , 
where r is the federal funds rate,7 p is the rate of inflation over the previous four 
quarters and y is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target, approximated by a 
(linear-)trend real GDP, the latter growing by 2.2% per year for the Taylor (1993) 
sample, 1984:1 through 1992:2. The first constant 2 (in parentheses) stands for the 
inflation target of the monetary authority and was assumed to be, in the US case for 
the sample period, 2% p.a.; the second constant 2 (the last term in the equation above) 
is the ‘equilibrium’ real interest rate (RIR), itself chosen so as to be close to the 
assumed steady-state growth rate of the economy of 2.2% (that is, as measured by the 
linear-trend real GDP growth). 
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The interpretation Taylor (1993), p. 202, suggested to his rule above was the 
following: 
“The policy rule ... has the feature that the federal funds rate rises if inflation 
increases above a target of 2 percent or if real GDP rises above trend GDP. If 
both the inflation rate and real GDP are on target, then the federal funds rate 
would equal 4 percent, or 2 percent in real terms.” 
Taylor (1993) did not estimate the policy response coefficients in the rule he 
proposed. He simply simulated this reaction function and drew attention to the very 
good fit it produced with respect to the actual federal funds rate (over a period of 24 
quarters, 1987:1-1992:4). The subsequent empirical literature, which mostly 
attempted econometric estimation, has criticized the original Taylor rule. The 
principal problems it identified were the serial correlation usually found in the error 
term and the potential endogeneity arising from the contemporaneous regressors, the 
latter also posing unrealistic informational requirements to the monetary authority. 
Feedback functions of the type Taylor (1993) suggested have therefore been 
augmented in a number of ways. 
Allowing for a richer dynamics has led to backward-looking reaction functions, with 
the dynamic structure truncated at some relevant lag length. However, estimation of 
all sorts of backward-looking Taylor rules is nowadays oversimplistic, given that 
rational agents, including the central bank, anticipate and forecast the variables of key 
interest to them. 
In accordance with considerations of rationality in economic behavior, the literature 
on policy reaction functions has complemented backward-looking specifications with 
forward-looking ones. Such versions of the Taylor rule are believed to be more 
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realistic. Moreover, forward-looking central bank feedback functions have recently 
been grounded in microfounded macroeconomic theory, and thus have a deep 
theoretical justification. 
In fact, optimal policy rules, i.e., feedback rules derived from explicit models, such as 
the New Keynesian model of monetary policy (without and with microfoundations) 
will not be purely forward-looking, as Woodford (2003), p. 57 (and chapter 7, in 
detail) has argued. They will usually be both expectations- and history-dependent, as 
is inflation targeting, and the lead and lag horizons in them will not be too long. We 
make use of such Taylor rule specifications in the empirical part: they are forward-
looking in inflation and the output gap and backward-looking in the interest rate (a 
feature known as interest rate smoothing, as will be explained later). 
Taylor rules have sometimes also explicitly included one or more (contemporaneous 
and lagged) exchange rate terms, which appears logical, especially in the case of a 
small open economy as the UK. Yet Taylor (2000) argues that there is no need to do 
so, because exchange rate dynamics will anyway be reflected in the dynamics of the 
price level – that is, in inflation as well. So, once an inflation term is included in the 
Taylor rule, the exchange rate is always implicit in the equation, via its pass-through 
onto consumer prices. Many sorts of other extensions to the standard Taylor rule have 
recently been proposed, but the ‘mainstream’ Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998, 2000) 
empirical approach usually sticks to conventional specifications, which we also do 
below. 
3.2 Instrument Rules vs Targeting Rules 
Svensson (1999, 2003) proposed to distinguish targeting rules from interest rate rules 
of the kind described in the preceding subsection. The best-known example of a 
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targeting rule is the inflation-forecast targeting rule commonly used – e.g., in Vickers 
(1998) – to explain the monetary policy framework implemented since 1992 by the 
Bank of England we sketched earlier. Woodford (2003), p. 43, characterizes it in a 
succinct manner: 
“According to the formula, the Bank should be willing to adopt a given 
operating target it for the overnight interest rate at date t if and only if the 
Bank’s forecast of the evolution of inflation over the next 2 years, conditional 
upon the interest rate remaining at the level it, implies an inflation rate of 2.5 
percent per annum (the Bank’s current inflation target) 2 years after date t.” 
The essence of the inflation-forecast targeting procedure consists in the fact that there 
is no formula prescribed for setting the central bank interest rate operating target. 
Instead, the BoE is free to set this target at whatever level is consistent with its 
inflation forecast (or projection) in order to meet a certain target criterion. The latter 
criterion may well resemble the right-hand side of a forward-looking Taylor rule 
(without an interest rate smoothing term), as argued by Svensson (1999). 
Given such similarity, we have not discarded the Taylor rule as a potential description 
of actually materialized monetary policy only because, on a normative basis, the Bank 
of England does not explicitly follow an instrument rule but a targeting rule. 
Moreover, Woodford (2003), chapter 8, has shown that although not optimal, Taylor 
rules are often suboptimal (or second-best) reaction functions, next to much more 
informationally requiring procedures and are, in such a sense, a feasible and 
transparent approximation. In selecting the forward-looking Taylor rules to estimate, 
we focused on simple(r) specifications that are justified from both theoretical 
(economic) and empirical (econometric) point of view. We believe that our results 
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support, to a large extent, the usefulness of Taylor rules in deriving certain lessons on 
the outcomes of central bank actions, even in the UK under inflation targeting. In 
particular, our empirical analysis confirms that the Bank of England has been, de 
facto, a flexible inflation targeter, i.e., one also paying attention to the output gap. This 
is in line with the current broader objectives of UK monetary policy, including 
(indirectly) growth and employment, as exposed in the beginning. 
4. Data and Preliminary Tests 
In our Taylor rule estimation we employ standard time series that are common in 
similar studies. However, we also make use of a few alternative proxies for the 
explanatory variables, which are of particular relevance for the UK. 
4.1 Data 
Sources and Frequency 
All time series were downloaded from the statistical pages on the websites of the UK 
Office of National Statistics (ONS) and the Bank of England (BoE). As mentioned, 
we work here with quarterly data, mostly because GDP-related data, used to measure 
the output gap in Taylor rules, are much more precise at a quarterly frequency, 
although also available at a monthly frequency. This certainly makes our subsamples 
smaller than if we had recurred to monthly time series. Yet our quarterly estimates 
turned out most of the time to be both significant in econometric terms and 
interpretable in economic terms. This is in part because, as Clarida-Galí-Gertler 
(1998, 2000) and Nelson (2003) have pointed out with respect to their earlier and 
similar empirical work, the variability of the data involved proves sufficient to 
produce reasonable results even in relatively small samples. 
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Variable Proxies 
Nominal Short-Term Interest Rate 
Following previous Taylor rule papers on the UK, in particular, Nelson (2003) and 
Martin and Milas (2004), we assume here that the short-term interest rate supposed to 
be the operating instrument of the Bank of England is best proxied by the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate. This is not quite precise, because since operational independence 
the Bank has been using the 2-week repo rate as its policy instrument. Yet the latter 
rate has been relatively recently introduced, i.e., in May 1997. As Nelson (2003) 
points out, the advantage of the 3-month Treasury bill rate is that, being very close to 
the various different rates – four in total since the early 1970s – that have played the 
role of operating instrument,8 it can be used, for greater comparability and with not 
much loss of precision, to approximate all of them when longer periods are of interest. 
Inflation 
Inflation is proxied in our study by two alternative indexes that are usual choices 
when working with UK data: 
• the RPI, as in Martin and Milas (2004) and Kesriyeli, Osborn and Sensier 
(2004), among others; and 
• the RPIX, as, for instance, in Nelson (2003). 
As for the consumer price index (CPI), which is the standard measure of inflation in 
most other economies, including for the purposes of monetary policy, we already 
noted that it has become the official index accounting for the evolution of the UK 
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general price level only since 2004, and has in this way precluded any possibility to 
use it in our study. 
Output Gap 
Our measure for the output gap is, alternatively, constructed out of two available time 
series: 
• the final (or revised) data for GDP, as in the majority of studies on Taylor 
rules; and 
• the real-time (or initially released) data for the same variable, GDP, which 
were available to policy makers ‘in real time’, that is, at the time of making 
decisions on monetary policy: more precisely, we use the series constructed by 
Nelson and Nikolov (2001) and accessible on the Bank of England’s website. 
Orphanides (2001, 2003) first argued that real-time data, in addition to being 
more realistic, might overturn some conclusions about feedback rules based on 
final data, a point for which we found empirical support here. 
Moreover, each of these two types of real GDP series has been filtered by two now 
standard (although not perfect) procedures to obtain a measure for the output gap, 
namely: 
• by fitting a quadratic trend, as in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) and 
Nelson (2003), among others; and 
• by a Hodrick-Prescott detrending (with a smoothing parameter of 1600, 
recommended for quarterly data), as in Martin and Milas (2004) and Kesriyeli, 
Osborn and Sensier (2004), among others. 
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Each of these methods has its advantages and shortcomings. For this reason, and also 
to arrive at results that are not necessarily sensitive to the detrending employed, we 
have preferred to work with both filtering procedures, as duly reported further down. 
4.2 Preliminary Tests 
Seasonality Tests 
Information contained in the files downloaded from the sources of our data, the ONS 
and the BoE, indicated certain inconsistency of the time series we wished to employ 
in the Taylor rule estimations with respect to their seasonal adjustment. More 
precisely, nominal GDP data and the GDP deflator – hence, real GDP, by construction 
– were provided at their source as seasonally adjusted (sa), whereas both price levels, 
the RPI and the RPIX, as well as the 3-month Treasury bill rate were not seasonally 
adjusted (nsa). 
We thus performed Census X12 seasonality tests9 and, consequently, two versions of 
our Taylor rule regressions: 
• with the raw data, as they were from their sources, i.e., with no seasonal 
adjustment to the RPI, the RPIX and the 3-month Treasury bill rate; and 
• with seasonally adjusted – by the Census X12 procedure – respective price 
levels and interest rate. 
We did so because of certain criticisms in the literature in the sense that 
deseasonalization techniques may diminish or eliminate important features of the raw 
time series and thus give rise to findings that do not necessarily reflect genuine 
correlations across the data. On the other hand, it seemed to us somewhat inconsistent 
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not to employ seasonally adjusted prices and interest rates side by side with (final) 
GDP data that were anyway seasonally adjusted at the source. We later on duly report 
both types of results, nsa and sa. 
Stationarity Tests 
A typical preliminary procedure in time series analysis, to avoid spurious regressions, 
is to test for (non)stationarity of the included variables. In the particular case of Taylor 
rule estimation, however, this has not been systematically done in most of the 
previous literature. To address the issue, we employed augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit root tests based on autoregressive models in parallel with kernel-based 
Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests, with the null for both tests being that of a unit root 
(i.e., nonstationarity) present. These two tests were further supplemented by a test 
constructed on the opposite null, of stationarity, namely the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, and both autoregressive and kernel-based specifications of 
it were used.10 
We generally found that the price levels, RPI and RPIX, could be either I(1) or I(2). 
Hence, inflation could be either stationary or not, depending on the chosen proxy and 
test. The 3-month Treasury bill rate and the real GDP gap obtained from quadratic-
trend fitting could not be treated with certainty neither as stationary nor as I(1) 
variables either, because of mixed findings from the alternative unit root tests and 
specifications within each test we resorted to. Only the real GDP gap obtained from 
Hodrick-Prescott detrending appeared to be most likely I(0). Bearing in mind the 
notorious low power of unit root tests, in particular, in short samples such as ours, we, 
after all, followed the New Keynesian theory of monetary policy and effected Taylor 
rule estimation in the standard way, as also argued and done by Clarida, Galí and 
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Gertler (1998, 2000). These authors defend the key assumptions in their work – 
stationarity of inflation and the nominal interest rate, as we shall also assume here – 
by stressing that they are both empirically and theoretically plausible. 
5. The NNS-GMM Approach to Estimating Forward-Looking Taylor Rules 
Our empirical strategy was to apply a common and theoretically consistent method to 
estimate forward-looking Taylor rules, namely the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM), as in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000).11 
5.1 Sketch of the Microfoundations: NNS 
It is nowadays standard to think of monetary policy reaction functions in general, and 
of Taylor rules in particular, as if derived from an underlying model of the economy. 
This model is usually the baseline New Keynesian model described in King and 
Woolman (1996) and Yun (1996), among others, and also called – first by Goodfriend 
and King (1997) and in a broader context – the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) 
model. It is not necessary for our purposes here to write down this model completely, 
because such sticky-price analytical frameworks have been well explored – see, for 
instance, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003). We 
would rather sketch its relevance to our estimation below, by simply stating its ‘core’ 
equations and then relating them to the forward-looking feedback rules we estimated. 
After log-linearization around a zero inflation steady state, the equilibrium conditions 
of the baseline New Keynesian (or NNS) model are embodied in four equations, 
which – following Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) in ignoring certain constant terms, 
but using a more explicit for our purposes notation – can be written as: 
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(1) [ ] ( )ttttt yIE ξλπδπ −+= +1 , 
(2) [ ] [ ]( ) ttttttt IEiIyEy ζπσ +−−= ++ 11 1 , 
(3) [ ] txttTt xIEi 0,11, βπβπ += ++ , 
(4) . ( ) Ttitit iii 1,11, 1 −−− −+= ββ
Equation (1) is a (New Keynesian) forward-looking Phillips curve, or also 
alternatively termed a (New Keynesian) forward-looking aggregate supply (AS) 
curve. πt is the rate of inflation. It is the information set available at time t. δ is the 
discount factor and λ the output elasticity of inflation. yt ≡ ln Yt is the current-period 
level of output and ξt is the natural rate of output, defined as the level of output that 
would obtain under fully flexible prices and assumed to follow an AR(1) process. 
This AS curve can be derived by aggregation of optimal price-setting decisions by 
monopolistically competitive firms under Calvo (1983) individual price adjustment. 
(2) is a (New Keynesian) forward-looking IS curve, and is derived as a combination 
of a standard consumption Euler equation and a market clearing condition. σ denotes 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) embedded in the utility function. ζt is 
in this context interpreted as an exogenous demand shock: like ξt in the aggregate 
supply curve (1), it is assumed to follow an AR(1) process. 
Equation (3) is a (New Keynesian) forward-looking monetary policy rule of the usual 
Taylor type, with itT denoting the NIR target of the central bank and xt some measure 
of the output gap at t. 
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(4), finally, is a (New Keynesian) interest rate smoothing equation, where it is the 
actual NIR. 
In our notation, all policy parameters are easily recognized by the letter β: each 
subscript to it consists of a pair of symbols, the first being the respective letter 
designating the variable to which the β-coefficient relates and the second being a 
positive or negative integer denoting the respective lead (+) or lag (–), with 0 standing 
for the current period. We use this notation further down in the text and tables for a 
clearer reference. 
Following the above New Keynesian approach, one can summarize the policy of the 
central bank by a linear instrument rule of the Taylor type involving forward-looking 
formation of rational expectations: 
(5) [ ]( ) [ ]tqtqxTtktkTTt IxEIEii ++++ +−+= ,, βππβπ . 
By construction, iT is the desired (constant) nominal interest rate when inflation is at 
its target level and output is at potential. (5) is the empirical counterpart of (3) above. 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) claim that such a monetary policy reaction 
function has some appeal on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, 
approximate forms of rules like (3) are optimal if the monetary authority has as 
objective a quadratic loss function in deviations of inflation and output from their 
respective targets in the context of the New Keynesian macromodel we have just 
outlined. Empirically, rules like (5) usually provide a reasonably good summary of 
most central banks’ behavior in recent years. 
Incorporating interest rate smoothing, widely supported by the practice of central 
banks as well as from a theoretical perspective, and allowing for exogenous interest 
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rate (i.e., here also monetary policy) shocks, requires an extension of the interest rate 
target (5) by also specifying a model for the actual interest rate: 
(6) , ( ) ( ) tTtitit iiLi νββ +−+= −− 1,1 1
where L denotes the lag operator and ( ) 1,12,01, ... −−−− +++≡ nniiii LLLL ββββ , with 
)1,0[1, ∈−iβ . In (6), βi(L) measures the degree of smoothing of interest rate changes 
and νt is a zero mean exogenous interest rate shock. Equation (6) is, in turn, the 
empirical counterpart of (4) above. 
Plugging the Taylor rule target (5) into the partial adjustment model (6), 
(7) ( ) ( ) [ ]( ) [ ]}{ ttqtqxTtktkTitit IxEIEiiLi νβππβββ π ++−+−+= ++++−− ,,1,1 1 , 
representing the expected values, [ ]tkt IE +π  and [ ]tqt IxE + , as realized values minus 
forecast errors, [ ]( )tktktkt IE +++ −− πππ  and [ ]( )tqtqtqt IxExx +++ −− , respectively, 
( ) += −1tit iLi β  
( ) [ ]( )[ ]( ) [ ]( )[ ]}{ ttqtqtqtqxTtktktktkTi IxExxIEi νβππππββ π +−−+−−−+−+ ++++++++− ,,1,1
 
and rearranging, yields 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ttiqtqxiktkiTkit iLxri εβββπββπββ ππ ++−+−+−−−= −++−++−+− 1,1,,1,,1, 111*1  
or 
(8) ( ) ( ) ( ) ttiqtqxiktkikit ixi εβββπββββ π ++−+−+−= −−++−++−+− 11,,1,,1,,01, 111  
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with ( ) 1,−≡ ii L ββ , , 
where  is the ‘equilibrium’ real interest rate and 
( ) TkTTkTTTkTk rii πβππβππββ πππ 1* ,,,,0 −−≡+−−≡−≡ ++++
TTir π−≡*
(9) ( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( )}{ ttqtqtqxtktktkit IxExIE νβππββε π +−+−−−≡ ++++++− ,,1,1 . 
It can be seen in (9) that the error term εt is a linear combination of forecast errors of 
inflation and the output gap (in curly brackets) and the exogenous disturbance to the 
interest rate νt. It is thus orthogonal to any variable in the information set It available 
at time t. 
5.2 Sketch of the Econometrics: GMM 
Now let zt denote a vector of variables within the central bank’s information set at the 
time when the decision on the interest rate is made – that is, zt ∈ It. As Clarida-Galí-
Gertler (1998), p. 1039, suggest, possible elements of zt (and, thus, instruments in the 
econometric sense) include any lagged variables that help forecast inflation and 
output, as well as any contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the 
current-period interest rate shock νt. Since [ ] 0=ttE zε , (8) then implies the set of 
orthogonality conditions 
(10) { ( )( ) }[ ] 01 11,,,,01, =−++−− −−+++++− ttiktkxktkkit ixiE zββπβββ π . 
These orthogonality conditions provide the basis for the estimation of the parameters 
of interest, collected in the vector β ≡ (β0,+k βπ,+k βx,+q βi,-1)’, applying the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) due to Hansen (1982). Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 
2000) note that, by construction, the first component of {εt} follows an MA(a) 
process, with a = max {k,q} - 1 and will thus be serially correlated unless k = q = 1. 
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For that reason, the GMM estimation should be carried out with a weighting matrix 
that is robust to autocorrelation, as we also do. Moreover, to the extent that the 
dimension of vector zt is higher than the number of parameters to estimate, (10) 
implies some overidentifying restrictions that can be tested in order to assess the 
validity of the specification estimated as well as the set of instruments used. We 
present such test statistics in Table 2 in the Appendix and discuss them further down. 
The test rests on the logic exposed in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), pp. 1040-1041. 
Finally, (8) can be written as 
(11) ttiqtqxktkkt ibxbbbi εππ ++++= −−+++++ 11,,,,0 , 
with 
(12) 1,1, −− ≡ iib β ; 
(13) ( ) kikb +−+ −≡ ,01,,0 1 ββ , hence 
1,
,0
,0 1 −
+
+ −≡ i
k
k b
bβ ; 
(14) ( ) kikb +−+ −≡ ,1,, 1 ππ ββ , hence 
1,
,
, 1 −
+
+ −≡ i
k
k b
bπ
πβ ; 
(15) ( ) qxiqxb +−+ −≡ ,1,, 1 ββ , hence 
1,
,
, 1 −
+
+ −≡ i
qx
qx b
bβ . 
We estimated directly via GMM equation (11) and then recovered the structural-form 
parameters (the β’s) from the reduced-form parameters (the b’s) using the 
correspondence in the definitions (12) through (15). Standard errors for the policy 
responses of interest (the β’s), reported in Table 2, were consequently computed by an 
application of the delta method.12 
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6. Key Results 
Let us now look in more detail at our key results. Table 1 in the Appendix presents 
descriptive statistics for the data in our two subsamples, before (Panel A) and after 
(Panel B) operational independence. Figure 1 provides, in turn, an overall impression 
for the evolution of the 3-month Treasury bill rate in the UK throughout the inflation 
targeting period, as well as by subsample. We estimated via GMM the forward-
looking Taylor rule specification in equation (11) with the lead for inflation varying 
from 1 to 8 quarters ahead, k = 1,...,8, and that for the output gap from 0 to 4, q = 
0,...,4. We then selected our ‘best’ regressions obtained from real-time (and nsa) vs 
final (and sa) data, as defined below and highlighted in Table 2 and figures 2-5 in the 
Appendix. 
We analyze and interpret our principal findings along two dimensions. We start by 
some comments on the parameters of the central bank’s reaction function extracted 
from the UK data, essentially comparing their magnitudes before and after operational 
independence. We then move to a more general discussion of the stance of Bank of 
England’s monetary policy. In both dimensions of the analysis, we would emphasize 
our quantitative results obtained from real-time (and nsa) data, and not final (and sa) 
data, for reasons that are made clear further down. 
6.1 Bank of England’s Policy Reaction Function under Inflation Targeting 
Table 2 reports the policy response coefficients from an identical forward-looking 
Taylor rule, equation (11) above, estimated over the pre-independence subsample 
(Panel A) and over the post-independence subsample (Panel B). In it, the leads of k = 
2 for inflation and of q = 0 for the output gap were retained as the preferred ones 
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across all attempted specifications, from the viewpoint of both econometrics and 
economics. 
To judge about the magnitude of the parameters in the Bank of England’s policy 
reaction function, we had to also make a choice concerning the appropriate variable 
proxies. Otherwise the results vary, sometimes considerably in quantitative terms, 
although rather weakly in a qualitative sense. We present two types of estimates, 
based on two particular sets of underlying quarterly data, namely, what can be called 
‘real-time’ data and ‘final’ data. Thus, the first two columns in Table 2 (in panels A 
and B) report our estimates based on ‘real-time’ data, that is, the RPIX (nsa) to 
calculate inflation, the 3-month Treasury bill (nsa) to define the short-term interest 
rate and real-time GDP data to approximate the output gap; in the latter case, results 
from both Hodrick-Prescott and quadratic detrending are given. The last two columns 
in Table 2 (in panels A and B) compare, instead, the respective coefficients obtained 
from ‘final’ data, that is, when the RPI (sa) – and not the RPIX (sa)13 – defines 
inflation, the 3-month Treasury bill (sa) serves as the short-term interest rate and final 
real GDP data approximate the output gap; again, estimates for both Hodrick-Prescott 
and quadratic detrending are reported. As can be verified in the last row of both 
panels A and B in Table 2, the validity of our overidentifying restrictions and of the 
set of our instruments cannot be rejected for all eight reported regressions. 
The combination of the annual change in the RPIX (nsa) as an inflation proxy and 
real-time GDP data as a basis to approximate the output gap (reflected in the first, 
‘real-time’ pair of columns in Table 2) was the policy relevant and only available set 
of information to the Bank of England at the time of actual monetary policy making. 
Moreover, this particular choice of variable proxies was also much better supported 
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by our econometric results, relative to the combination of RPI (sa) and final GDP data 
(underlying the results highlighted in the last, ‘final’ pair of columns in Table 2). For 
example, the goodness of fit in Panel B for the final set of data appears unreasonably 
high; together with the very high lagged dependent variable coefficients, this is 
problematic and may be a sign of misspecification. Furthermore, the statistical 
significance of some of the coefficients of interest in the last two columns of Table 2 
is not assured either. 
Our findings confirm, first of all, the point made by Orphanides (2001, 2003): in all 
four specifications based on ‘real-time’ data the goodness of fit is high enough, but 
without being suspiciously high; then, all coefficients except one (15 out of 16) are 
statistically significant at all conventional levels; moreover, the positive expected 
signs of the response to both inflation and the output gap and the bounds well away 
from the extremes of 0 and 1 of the smoothing parameter are always satisfied. This is 
a second reason, in addition to realism (or relevance), to place greater weight and 
confidence on our estimates from the ‘real-time’ data set relative to the corresponding 
‘final’ set. 
We next look at the magnitude of the Bank of England’s reaction function 
coefficients, in particular before and after operational independence. As explained, we 
would mostly emphasize the quantitative dimension of our results obtained from the 
‘real-time’ data. 
Reaction to Inflation 
What appeared to us unexpected, at least at an initial glance, was that the (positive) 
magnitude of the coefficient to inflation had declined in the post-independence 
subsample relative to the pre-independence subsample. More precisely, this decline – 
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captured by our ‘real-time’ (but not ‘final’) data – is rather moderate: the quadratic 
specification registers a drop of βπ,+2 from 0.67 to 0.50 and the Hodrick-Prescott one 
from 0.81 to 0.50 (with that latter coefficient only marginally insignificant at the 10% 
level). Interestingly, both estimated versions (quadratic and Hodrick-Prescott) agree 
exactly on the response to inflation after operational independence, which is 
quantified at 0.50. This particular magnitude as well as the higher values extracted 
from the ‘real-time’ data for the pre-independence period are furthermore smaller than 
unity, so that the policy response during the inflation targeting period has been rather 
mitigated (or inelastic). Most of our alternative specifications with various underlying 
proxies seem overall to confirm that the reaction to inflation has been somewhat 
weakened in the post-independence relative to the pre-independence sample (although 
an exception can be seen in the ‘final’ data columns of Table 2).  
A likely reason for the weaker policy response to inflation can, of course, be the 
decline in the rate of inflation itself, observed since the mid-1990s not only in Britain 
but in most developed countries. This trend to lower inflation is partly due to more 
prudent and technocratic policy making in these countries, but also partly a 
consequence of a favorable economic environment both globally and nationally, as we 
shall see below for the UK. Hence, any precise quantification of the contribution of 
inflation targeting and operational independence to a lower inflation rate in Britain, as 
well as across the industrialized world, remains an issue for further study. Yet it 
would be difficult to deny the success of inflation targeting in anchoring inflation 
expectations, and here the UK case is particularly illustrative. Moreover, low and 
stable inflation would further contribute to growth, by stabilizing at a low level the 
real rate of interest. In this sense, exploring the implications of the assumption for a 
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constant ‘equilibrium’ RIR, inherent in the Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998, 2000) GMM 
approach we utilized, offers another avenue for future research. 
Interest Rate Smoothing 
According to our ‘real-time’ set of UK data, the degree of interest rate smoothing 
appears to have declined considerably in the post-independence period, of the order of 
two to three times. The corresponding ‘final’ data numbers in Table 2, however, 
suggest a slight increase. Therefore this matter is likewise left for additional 
investigation. 
Reaction to the Output Gap 
As far as the policy response to the output gap is concerned, our overall econometric 
results from both employed data sets were largely supportive – in qualitative and, to a 
substantial extent, also quantitative terms – to what Table 2 selectively reports in its 
first pair of columns. Most of our specifications that make good sense both 
economically and econometrically have produced statistically significant and positive 
estimates for the coefficient to the contemporaneous output gap, βx,0. Moreover, they 
indicate almost unanimously (although an exception can be seen in the ‘final’ data 
Hodrick-Prescott column of Table 2) a considerable rise in the magnitude of this 
parameter in the post-independence period: of the order of two times and a half, 
according to the ‘real-time’ data set. This quite robust finding at first appeared 
puzzling. In trying to understand it, we had to relate it to the stage of the business 
cycle, in particular, before and after operational independence. 
Let us compare the (dominant) phase of the UK business cycle by looking again at the 
descriptive statistics in Table 1 (panels A vs B). The mean output gap in 1992:4-
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1997:1 has been of the order of -0.38% of potential output (Hodrick-Prescott measure) 
to -1.24% (quadratic measure) if final GDP data are used and of the order of -0.34% 
(Hodrick-Prescott measure) to -0.97% (quadratic measure) with real-time GDP data 
instead; the same statistic for the period of operational independence, 1997:3-2004:4 
(or 2001:4 for real-time GDP data), is of the order of 0.07% (Hodrick-Prescott 
measure) to 0.16% (quadratic measure) if final GDP data are used and of the order of 
0.11% (Hodrick-Prescott measure) to -0.05% (quadratic measure) with real-time GDP 
data. This dimension of our analysis makes clearly the point that the Bank of England 
has reacted in a much stronger way to the output gap when aggregate demand has, on 
average, been close(r) to potential, thus creating inflationary pressures, i.e., (mostly) 
during the post-independence period. Such evidence is consistent with New 
Keynesian theory, in particular under inflation targeting when the primary (if not the 
only) concern of the central bank is to keep low and stable inflation. The monetary 
authority should react more aggressively to the output gap (for theoretical reasons), 
and did seem to act so (in our empirical results), in a stage of the business cycle above 
or close to potential output when inflationary pressures increase and put at risk the 
credibly stabilized inflation at target. 
6.2 Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Stance under Inflation Targeting 
To discuss now the stance of British monetary policy in the spirit of Taylor (1993), 
we re-estimated equation (11) with k = 2 and q = 0 over the whole inflation targeting 
period (and using both our final and real-time data sets). We begin by noting the 
following facts. First, the 3-month Treasury bill rate has been mostly trending up 
before operational independence and down after that; second, its average level has 
also been lower in the post-independence subsample (see Figure 1 and, for numerical 
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values, Table 1). Insofar as Bank of England’s monetary management has affected 
this short-term reference rate, an evident lesson from the UK experience is that 
inflation targeting coupled with operational independence does not necessarily imply 
an upward pressure on interest rates, as supporters of a more ‘activist’ monetary 
policy might claim. 
Again, we have to distinguish our results from the ‘real-time’ vs ‘final’ data sets, 
placing more weight on the former – for economic and econometric reasons as we 
argued. 
Final Data Taylor Rules: Good Overall Fit for the UK with a ‘Neutral’ Stance 
Similarly to the original article by Taylor (1993) on US data, figures 2 (with Hodrick-
Prescott detrending to obtain the output gap) and 3 (with quadratic detrending) – both 
based on our ‘final’ data set – convince in the very good visual fit ex post in the UK 
case under inflation targeting as well: the Taylor-rule implied interest rate and the 
actual one move quite close to one another. The Hodrick-Prescott version, in Figure 2, 
performs marginally better in that sense. 
Both figures also agree in hardly identifying evident episodes of any persistent stance 
– either expansionary or contractionary – of Bank of England’s monetary policy. This 
can be verified by noting that the peaks and troughs of the residual in the two figures 
rarely go out of the band of plus/minus one standard deviation; and when they do so, 
it lasts for only one quarter. More importantly, judging by these figures it turns out (ex 
post) that UK monetary policy has been overall just right, or ‘neutral’, throughout the 
inflation targeting period. 
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Real-Time Data Taylor Rules: Monetary Tightening and Easing in the UK 
Looking at the same pair of graphs but now computed from our ‘real-time’ data, in 
figures 4 and 5, the picture is different. There are much clearer indications for a ‘non-
neutral’ stance of monetary policy during certain periods within and across the two 
subsamples, again roughly coinciding regardless the detrending method applied to 
measure the output gap. These findings, being based on ‘real-time’ data, are more 
relevant in describing what kind of monetary policy the Bank of England had wished 
to conduct ex ante. 
We can easily identify as periods of an expansionary stance the first half of 1996 (2 
consecutive quarters), the second half of 1998 and the first half of 1999 (4 consecutive 
quarters), and the whole of 2001 (roughly, 4 consecutive quarters). At the same time, 
our preferred forward-looking Taylor rule specifications uncover only one important 
episode of a contractionary stance, the entire year of 1993 (roughly, 4 consecutive 
quarters). This latter episode of monetary tightening is obviously a consequence of the 
developments in the British economy and in the institutional framework for monetary 
policy during the previous year – namely, the ERM crisis of the summer of 1992 and 
the shift to inflation targeting in the autumn of 1992. More precisely, having moved to 
a new monetary regime after suffering an exchange rate panic, the Bank of England 
had to restore stability of the sterling as well as its own credibility. The brief episode 
of monetary easing in early 1996, on the other hand, could be attributed to an attempt 
for a slight boost to the economy, meanwhile recovering from the recession of 1992-
1993; by that time, the sterling had largely restored its value and the Bank of England 
had considerably improved its credibility. As for the longer episodes of an 
expansionary stance, in 1998-1999 and again throughout 2001, these may have finally 
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been due to the Bank trying to counterweigh some recessionary trends and related 
fears, mostly originating in the neighboring European economies but also in the US, 
given that by the late 1990s inflation expectations in the UK had already been firmly 
anchored at the target inflation of 2.5% p.a. 
7. Concluding Comments 
This paper recovered and evaluated empirically the reaction function and the stance of 
UK monetary policy under inflation targeting, in effect since October 1992. Our key 
contribution was to compare two major subsamples, before the Bank of England was 
granted operational independence from HM Treasury in May 1997 and after that. The 
econometric approach we employed, theoretically grounded within the New 
Keynesian model of monetary policy, relied on estimating forward-looking Taylor 
rules via GMM from quarterly data. Our main conclusions are as follows. 
The use of real-time vs final data matters – mostly in a quantitative sense and less so 
in a qualitative sense – when describing by forward-looking Taylor rules the policy 
stance and the reaction function of the Bank of England throughout the inflation 
targeting period. As also claimed in the related literature, the feedback rules based on 
real-time data provide a more reasonable description, in both an econometric and 
economic context, of recent UK monetary policy relative to the same equations based 
on final data. 
Our estimates from real-time data, which are the relevant information set for policy 
making in ‘real time’, indicate that the dominant stance of UK monetary policy has 
been different in the pre- and post-independence subsamples. It is characterized by 
one contractionary episode and one expansionary episode before the Bank of England 
was granted operational independence and two longer expansionary episodes after 
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that. These findings appear consistent with the UK economic and institutional 
environment of the time. 
Our forward-looking Taylor rules based on real-time data also uncover an asymmetric 
monetary policy reaction function of the Bank of England, in the sense that its 
response to the output gap was considerably stronger in the post-independence 
subsample and to inflation somewhat weaker. We have argued that this result seems 
in line with New Keynesian theory of monetary policy once the stage of the UK 
business cycle is taken into account. Such a behavior may therefore characterize 
British inflation targeting under operational independence as less rigid than the 
recently criticized rather ‘monetarist’ strategy of the European Central Bank but also 
less ‘Keynesian’ than the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve, legally granted – 
and apparently often recurring to – more discretion in accommodating shocks. 
Overall, we have thus presented evidence that helps overcome several potential 
prejudices against inflation targeting, the more so when implemented under a greater 
central bank autonomy, as a too mechanistic ‘rule’ that leaves no room for 
‘discretion’. In particular, for the United Kingdom, we find that inflation targeting 
coupled with operational independence does not necessarily generate a deflationary 
bias in monetary policy, neither a ‘benign neglect’ to the evolution of the business 
cycle. In fact, the operational independence subperiod has been different from the pre-
independence one in terms of lower interest rates, inflation stabilized very close to 
target, less restrictive stance of monetary policy, and stronger sensitivity of the Bank 
of England to the output gap. Such a reaction would, first of all, characterize the Bank 
as a flexible inflation targeter, as should be expected given the broader objectives of 
UK monetary policy. Second, the asymmetry in the feedback function appears 
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justified and deserves credit: the Bank of England has optimally been balancing 
between the ‘rule’ (inflation targeting) and ‘discretion’ (operational independence), 
given the delegated institutional objective (the inflation target) and the constraint of 
the evolving economic environment (the business cycle). 
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Endnotes 
1. No matter the slight conceptual difference, inflation targeting is, in practice, rather 
inflation-forecast targeting. We shall further down simply refer to inflation targeting, 
formally meaning in the UK context inflation-forecast targeting. 
2. The narrower term of operational independence (of the central bank), and not the 
more general notion of central bank independence, is the appropriate one for the UK 
case. The move to operational independence essentially allowed the Bank of England 
to set interest rates, earlier the task of HM Treasury. 
3. A companion paper, Mihailov (2005), addresses a related question: whether, and 
how, increased independence has affected the behavior of the Bank of England within 
the inflation targeting period. It goes beyond the GMM technique applied to forward-
looking Taylor rules and the final vs real-time data opposition to offer a unifying 
interpretation of the Bank’s reaction function in terms of a few general findings that 
survive across alternative estimation methods and data availability timing. 
4. For a concise summary of the general criticisms of interest rate rules, see Woodford 
(2003), chapter 1, section 4.2, pp. 44-49. 
5. The main reason for this exclusion has been claimed to be that the mortgage rate 
tends to move closely with Bank of England’s operating instrument. 
6. The normative implication has emerged from stochastic simulation of a number of 
econometric models Taylor (1993) and Henderson and McKibbin (1993) undertook 
and published at nearly the same time. 
7. Which is the short-term interest rate target for monetary policy in the US context. 
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8. Including also – in addition to the currently used repo rate – the bank rate (through 
September 1972), the minimum lending rate (October 1972 – July 1981) and the 
minimum band 1 dealing rate (August 1981 – April 1997), as can be learnt from the 
BoE website. 
9. Detailed results from our seasonality tests are available upon request. 
10. Detailed results from our stationarity tests are available upon request. 
11. Another recent estimation technique, which we do not pursue here, was 
implemented by Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2000). They apply the structural 
time series (STS) approach proposed by Harvey (1989) to generate series of the 
expected inflation rate and output gap. By contrast, the Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998, 
2000) GMM approach essentially consists in using the errors-in-variables method to 
model rational expectations: in it, instead of forecasting inflation and output (e.g., by 
Kalman filter methods, as in Muscatelli-Tirelli-Trecroci (2000)), future actual values 
replace as regressors expected values, as we explain in detail further down in the main 
text. 
12. A technical appendix in Mihailov (2005) describes in detail the derivation of the 
formulas used for computation in the programs. 
13. Our results when combining the RPIX (sa) with final data for real GDP – and with 
the 3-month Treasury bill (sa) – are quite unsatisfactory in econometric terms and, 
moreover, cannot be interpreted in a reasonable economic way. For this reason, we do 
not report such estimates here. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
 
1992:4 – 1997:1 
 Inflation, % pa RGDP growth, % pa RGDP gap, % of potential 
 RPI RPIX Fin RT 
3m TB, 
% pa HP Fin Q Fin HP RT Q RT 
Mean 2.48 2.80 2.92 2.98 5.79 -0.38 -1.24 -0.34 -0.97 
Median 2.54 2.81 2.84 2.77 5.76 0.04 -0.73 0.02 -0.49 
Max 3.60 3.62 4.68 4.97 6.73 0.65 -0.11 0.95 0.20 
Min 1.29 2.17 0.99 0.87 4.95 -2.15 -3.09 -2.35 -2.38 
SD 0.65 0.35 1.03 1.13 0.58 0.97 1.04 1.06 1.10 
J-B p-v 0.79 0.81 0.94 0.82 0.57 0.23 0.26 0.35 0.29 
# obs 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample 
1997:3 – 2004:4 (or 2001:4 for real-time GDP data) 
 Inflation, % pa RGDP growth, % pa RGDP gap, % of potential 
 RPI RPIX Fin RT 
3m TB, 
% pa HP Fin Q Fin HP RT Q RT 
Mean 2.50 2.34 2.74 2.71 5.09 0.07 0.16 0.11 -0.05 
Median 2.66 2.27 2.73 2.82 4.85 0.10 0.24 0.15 -0.05 
Max 3.94 2.90 4.33 3.55 7.50 0.90 1.60 0.61 0.64 
Min 1.04 1.85 1.52 1.63 3.50 -0.85 -1.25 -0.68 -1.35 
SD 0.83 0.31 0.71 0.59 1.20 0.46 0.87 0.37 0.50 
J-B p-v 0.36 0.40 0.69 0.57 0.35 0.70 0.43 0.50 0.35 
# obs 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 18 18 
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Data for the UK under Inflation Targeting 
Note to Table 1 (panels A and B): RGDP = Real GDP; 3m TB = 3-month Treasury bill rate; RT = 
real-time (data); Fin = final (data); HP = Hodrick-Prescott (detrending); Q = quadratic (detrending); SD 
= standard deviation; J-B p-v = Jarque-Bera statistic probability value (for testing the null of normality 
of regression residuals); # obs = number of observations. 
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Data: ‘Real-time’ ≡ RPIX (nsa) and real-time 
GDP, 1992:4–1997:1 (18 observations) 
‘Final’ ≡ RPI (sa) and final GDP, 
1992:4–1997:1 (18 observations) 
GDP filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott 
β0,+2 4.58***(0.38) 3.49***(0.47) 6.73***(1.46) 3.46***(0.34) 
βπ,+2 0.67***(0.19) 0.81***(0.14) 0.27      (0.30) 0.83***(0.07) 
βx,0 0.63***(0.05) 0.97***(0.04) 0.60***(0.18) 0.57***(0.07) 
βi,-1 0.56***(0.03) 0.60***(0.02) 0.70***(0.04) 0.65***(0.02) 
Adj R2 0.66 0.68 0.64 0.78 
OvId p-v 0.81 0.82 0.89 0.82 
Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample 
Data: ‘Real-time’ ≡ RPIX (nsa) and real-time 
GDP, 1997:3–2001:4 (18 observations) 
‘Final’ ≡ RPI (sa) and final GDP,1997:3–2004:4 
(28 observations, 2 degrees of freedom lost) 
GDP filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott 
β0,+2 4.75***(0.27) 4.52***(0.26) 0.61      (0.56) -1.96      (2.18) 
βπ,+2 0.50***(0.16) 0.50      (0.29) 1.70***(0.11) 3.52***(0.42) 
βx,0 1.79***(0.06) 2.50***(0.10) 0.74***(0.16) -2.01*    (1.15) 
βi,-1 0.37***(0.02) 0.17***(0.08) 0.72***(0.03) 0.93***(0.02) 
Adj R2 0.86 0.75 0.93 0.91 
OvId p-v 0.79 0.74 0.64 0.78 
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample 
Table 2: Forward-Looking Taylor Rule Estimates for the UK under Inflation Targeting 
Note to Table 2 (panels A and B): Estimation by GMM using a Newey-West weighting matrix robust 
to error autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of unknown form; the instrument set includes 4 lags of 
all (3) variables in the estimated equation, (11), with k = 2 and q = 0, and a constant; standard errors in 
parentheses for the indirectly estimated (structural-form) coefficients (the β’s) are computed via the 
delta method; ***, **, * = statistical significance at 1, 5, 10% level, respectively, for the corresponding 
directly estimated (reduced-form) coefficients (the b’s); Adj R2 = adjusted R2; OvId p-v = probability 
value of the Hansen test of (9 = 13 instruments – 4 parameters to estimate) overidentifying restrictions. 
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Figure 1: 
Actual 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate, UK, 1992:4 – 2004:4 (49 observations), % p.a., 
dashed lines indicate average level by subsample, shaded area denotes pre-
independence period. 
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Figure 2: 
Actual and Taylor-Rule Fitted 3-Month Treasury Bill Rates, UK, 1992:4 – 2004:2 (47 
observations), % p.a., ‘final’ (and sa) data, Hodrick-Prescott trend to obtain real GDP 
gap, shaded area denotes pre-independence period; fitted values obtained after 
estimating equation (11) via GMM, as explained in the Note to Table 2, over the 
whole sample. 
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Figure 3: 
Actual and Taylor-Rule Fitted 3-Month Treasury Bill Rates, UK, 1992:4 – 2004:2 (47 
observations), % p.a., ‘final’ (and sa) data, quadratic trend to obtain real GDP gap, 
shaded area denotes pre-independence period; fitted values obtained after estimating 
equation (11) via GMM, as explained in the Note to Table 2, over the whole sample. 
Alexander Mihailov, UK Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting 46
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
3
4
5
6
7
8
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
residual actual fitted
 
Figure 4: 
Actual and Taylor-Rule Fitted 3-Month Treasury Bill Rates, UK, 1992:4 – 2001:4 (37 
observations), % p.a., ‘real-time’ (and nsa) data, Hodrick-Prescott trend to obtain real 
GDP gap, shaded area denotes pre-independence period; fitted values obtained after 
estimating equation (11) via GMM, as explained in the Note to Table 2, over the 
whole sample. 
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Figure 5: 
Actual and Taylor-Rule Fitted 3-Month Treasury Bill Rates, UK, 1992:4 – 2001:4 (37 
observations), % p.a., ‘real-time’ (and nsa) data, quadratic trend to obtain real GDP 
gap, shaded area denotes pre-independence period; fitted values obtained after 
estimating equation (11) via GMM, as explained in the Note to Table 2, over the 
whole sample. 
